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A patent protects the patent-holder from ﬁrms copying its product for a given period. In
other words, patents restrict entry of homogeneous (identical) products during the patent
period. However, patents rarely lead to a complete monopolisation of a market. In most
cases, a patent just requires that new products must be suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, implying
some degree of competition in the market.
The rationale behind patents is to stimulate ﬁrms to undertake R&D investments to
discover new products by granting market power and thus returns on the investments. A
generous patent system is likely to stimulate innovation strongly. However, there may be
a ﬂip-side of the coin. A generous patent system may also induce patent-holding ﬁrms to
exhibit market power in a potentially detrimental way. This is the basic idea explored in
this paper. In a model framework designed to ﬁt the pharmaceutical industry, we analyse
how a patent-holding ﬁrm may strategically use advertising ex ante to aﬀect the R&D
investments in new products, and thereby reducing the probability of increased future
competition.
The relationship between innovation and marketing is of special interest for the phar-
maceutical industry. This industry is highly R&D-intensive and patents of chemical com-
pounds play a crucial role in terms of stimulating developments of new drugs. The phar-
maceutical industry is also one of the most advertising-intensive industries (Scherer and
Ross, 1990). Marketing expenditures typically amount to 20-40 percent of sales revenues,
often exceeding R&D expenditures. According to Schweitzer (1997) the marketing ex-
penses for three of the largest US pharmaceutical companies — Merck, Pﬁzer, and Eli Lilly
— ranged from 21 to 40% of annual sales revenues, while the R&D expenses varied between
11 and 15%.1
The basic structure of our model is as follows. We consider a therapeutic market
with potentially two (horizontally) diﬀerentiated drugs, where one of the drugs is already
discovered — the breakthrough drug — and under patent protection. The incumbent is thus
1Similar ﬁgures are reported from Novartis and Aventis, the largest pharmaceutical companies in Eu-
rope. See also Zweifel and Breyer (1997) for ﬁgures for Germany and Switzerland.
2a monopolist and advertises the drug, taking into account the possibility of future entry
of new competing products. A new competing product may or may not be discovered,
depending on the amount of R&D investments incurred by the incumbent and a potential
entrant. If the incumbent is successful, he becomes multi-product monopolist, a situation
often referred to as brand-proliferation. On the other hand, if the new drug is discovered by
the potential entrant, there is a duopoly, where the incumbent and the entrant advertise
accordingly to capture market shares. Finally, if none of the ﬁrms are successful, the
incumbent remains a single-product monopolist in the market.
This modelling set-up builds on two empirical observations:2 ﬁrst, the vast majority
of pharmaceutical innovations are follow-on drugs rather than completely new medical
treatments. Lu and Comanor (1998) ﬁnd that all but 13 of 148 new branded chemical
entities introduced in the US between 1978-87 had at least one fairly close substitute;
the average number of substitutes being 1.86. Scherer (2000) reports that the number of
drugs per symptom group ranged from 1 to 50, with a median of 5 drugs and a mean of
6.04. Second, there is a large variation in the degree of competition across therapeutic
markets. Some therapeutic ﬁelds are monopolised by a dominant pharmaceutical company,
often having several related drugs on the market, while other therapeutic ﬁelds are highly
competitive with several pharmaceutical ﬁrms oﬀering diﬀerent products that can cure
the same disease (Scherer, 2000). Thus, our set-up applies to a wide set of therapeutic
markets, and oﬀers explanations for market structure variation across therapeutic markets.
In line with the speciﬁc features of pharmaceutical markets, we restrict attention to
non-price strategies — innovation and marketing — by assuming that ﬁrms face exogenous
(regulated) drug prices.3 The importance of non-price strategies in the pharmaceutical
m a r k e tc a nb ee x p l a i n e db yt h ef a c tt h a tm o s tc o u n t r i e se x e r ts o m es o r to fp r i c ec o n t r o l
2There are also many examples that may illustrate this particular set-up. For instance, in the class of
anti-ulcer drugs called H2-antagonists, SmithKline introduced the breakthrough drug Tagamet in 1977.
Tagamet was heavily advertised and it took six years before Glaxo, which then was a rival ﬁrm, entered
the market with a new, competing drug, Zantac. Similar patterns can be found for cholesterol-reducing
medicines, high-blood pressure medicines, etc.
3Although this assumption is most appropriate in pharmaceutical markets, there are several papers on
patents with a more general applicability that abstract from pricing strategies, see, e.g., Needham (1976),
Waterson (1990) and Langinier (2004).
3either directly by regulating the prices or indirectly via the reimbursement system.4 In
addition, the demand for pharmaceuticals is highly price inelastic, mainly due to health
insurance and/or physicians’ ignorance of price in the prescription choice.5
In a fairly general framework, we obtain two main results. First, we show that ad-
vertising and R&D are substitute strategies for the incumbent ﬁrm — implying that more
advertising will, all else equal, induce the incumbent to spend less on R&D — if the fol-
lowing two conditions are met, in equilibrium: (i) the second-order cross derivatives of
demand with respect to advertising expenditures are negative (implying that advertising
expenditures are strategic substitutes), and (ii) the second-order cross derivatives of the
innovation success functions are suﬃciently small in absolute value.6
Second, under these general conditions, we show that the incumbent has an incentive
to strategically overinvest in advertising in order to negatively aﬀect R&D investments and
thereby protect its existing patent rent. The key mechanism in the relationship between
advertising and R&D incentives is the incumbent’s ability to inﬂuence ex post payoﬀs
of the potential entrant through ex ante advertising of the existing product.7 If drug
marketing has a business-stealing eﬀect, advertising may serve as a rent-shifting device,
reducing the R&D incentives of the potential entrant.8
We also derive a general condition for identifying under which circumstances the incum-
bent has incentives to invest too much in advertising from a social welfare perspective. We
conclude that, under reasonable assumptions, socially excessive advertising is more likely
to occur if there is a stronger persuasive element to advertising, and/or if the patent rent
is higher (due to either longer patent periods or a higher regulated drug price). Naturally,
4Kanavos (2001) provides a comprehensive overview of pharmaceutical regulation practices in 14 EU
countries. See also Danzon (1997) for an overview of theory and practices of pharmaceutical price regula-
tion.
5See Newhouse (1993), Scherer (2000) and Rizzo (1999).
6Obviously, advertising and R&D can be substitutes for ﬁnancial reasons: the patent-holder has to
decide whether to spend more on advertising or on research, but cannot spend as much on both because
of ﬁnancial constraints. In this paper, we abstract from ﬁnancial constraints and focus exclusively on the
potential strategic relationship between the advertising and R&D.
7This mechanism was observed by Needham (1976), who argued that an incumbent’s pre-entry advertis-
ing inﬂuences the entry decision only if there is some link between pre-entry advertising and the entrant’s
post-entry expected proﬁts.
8The empirical study by Berndt et al. (1995) of the H2-antagonist market shows that drug marketing
is neither purely business-stealing nor purely market-expanding, but somewhere in between.
4a divergence between private and social advertising incentives opens for a discussion of
relevant policy measures, like restrictions on drug marketing and the generosity of the
patent system. These issues are especially relevant for the pharmaceutical industry, since
most countries impose regulations on both marketing and prices of prescription drugs.
Our analysis suggests that strict regulation of advertising and strict price regulation (or,
equivalently, a less generous patent system) are policy substitutes, implying that a gen-
erous patent (or price regulation) system should be matched with strict regulation on
advertising, and vice versa.
Applying the general framework to a standard informative advertising model (see
e.g., Butters, 1977; Grossman and Shapiro, 1984), we show that advertising and R&D
are substitute strategies and that the incumbent always has an incentive to strategically
overinvest in advertising in order to reduce the probability for a new product being devel-
oped by the potential entrant. Using numerical simulations, we also demonstrate that a
generous patent system (equivalently, generous drug prices) tends to stimulate marketing
incentives relative to R&D incentives, and, ﬁnally, that our conclusions from the general
welfare analysis about the relationship between patent rent and advertising incentives are
strongly conﬁrmed, even in a setting where advertising is purely informative.
We ﬁnd these results interesting for several reasons: ﬁrst, the potentially negative
impact of a more generous patent protection on R&D incentives runs counter to the general
presumption in most theoretical papers on optimal patent design (see, e.g., Denicolo, 1996).
On the other hand, the results seem to be in line with the recent, though scarce, empirical
studies on this topic. For instance, Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) ﬁnd no evidence of
an increase in either R&D spending or innovative output due to the Japanese patent law
reform, strengthening the patent protection in Japan. In addition, Jaﬀe (2000) documents
several studies from the US, which oﬀer indirect evidence that calls the value of stronger
patents into questions. Our paper provides one possible answer to this puzzle, namely
that a patent enables the patent-holder to exploit market power — in our case by means of
marketing — to reduce incentives for R&D innovations of new, competing products. The
5market power eﬀect can be viewed as a negative, indirect eﬀect counteracting any positive,
direct eﬀects of patents on innovation.
The general insight that advertising can strategically preempt R&D is of course not
entirely novel. Although there are, to our knowledge, no previous studies of the strate-
gic link between advertising and R&D,9 our paper is clearly related to the literature on
advertising and entry (see, e.g., Schmalensee, 1983, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984, Ishigaki,
2000). A striking conclusion from this literature is that the incumbent can deter entry
by strategically under-investing in advertising, a result that runs counter to the related
literature on production capacities.10 Advertising is assumed to be a durable investment,
but the incumbent can always increase the advertising stock ex post if this is proﬁtable.
This raises a concern whether the incumbent can credibly commit to under-invest in ad-
vertising. Schmalensee (1983) observes this problem, but avoids it by making restrictions
on the incumbent’s advertising choices.11 Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) also avoids this
problem simply by making second-period advertising exogenous.
In our model, entry only occurs with a certain probability, depending on the amount
of R&D incurred by the contestants. By focusing on non-price competition, we establish
incentives for over-investment in advertising by the incumbent ﬁrm, which contrasts with
results for entry deterrence under price or quantity competition, as previously discussed.
In doing so, we also enforce dynamic consistency by allowing the incumbent to re-optimise
its advertising investment ex post. More precisely, if it is proﬁtable for the incumbent
to advertise more heavily if entry occurs than if not, then it is never credible for the
incumbent to under-invest in advertising ex ante. The potential entrant will foresee this
and base its decision on the ex post advertising level.
9The theoretical section in Ellison and Ellison (2007) is perhaps an exception, if we interprete the
uncertain entry cost as R&D investments. However, the eﬀect of patent protection on marketing and R&D
incentives is not an issue. Furthermore, another main diﬀerence to our study is that they do not allow the
entrant to advertise its product. This assumption may be justiﬁed by the fact that they are concerned with
generic entry. Our interest is in entry of therapeutic competitors, which are typically heavily advertised.
As our analysis shows, this changes the incumbent’s ex ante (pre-entry) advertising incentives substantially.
10For instance, Dixit (1980) shows that an incumbent strategically overinvests in capacity in order to
deter entry from a potential entrant.
11The assumption that the incumbent can credibly commit not to increase its advertising after entry, is
justiﬁed by Schmalensee (1983) as follows: "Under some conditions, destruction of the materials necessary
to print more leaﬂets may serve to accomplish this" (p. 647). This justiﬁcation is certainly debatable.
6Our paper also relates to more speciﬁc studies of pharmaceutical markets. In this ﬁeld,
the issue of advertising and entry has received considerable attention for a long period,
especially from empirical studies, see, e.g., Hurwitz and Caves (1988), Caves et al. (1991),
Grabowski and Vernon (1992), and Scott Morton (2000).12 Ac o m m o nﬁnding is that
there is no evidence of entry deterring behaviour on the part of incumbents. However, all
these papers are concerned about branded vs. generic competition, which means that they
are considering competition between homogenous or ‘artiﬁcially’ vertically diﬀerentiated
products.13 To our best knowledge, there is no study that analyses advertising as a
device for restricting competition between branded (or patented) products, nor the eﬀect
of advertising on R&D investments.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We present the general model framework
in Section 2 and derive the equilibrium in terms of advertising and R&D investments in
Section 3. Some welfare properties of the equilibrium are analysed in Section 4, with a
discussion of corresponding policy implications. In Section 5 we illustrate our model by
analysing a standard (parameterised) informative advertising model. Finally, the paper is
concluded in Section 6.
2A g e n e r a l m o d e l
Consider a therapeutic market with potentially two horizontally diﬀerentiated patented
products (prescription drugs). One of the products — the ‘breakthrough’ drug — has already
been developed by ﬁrm 1. The second (horizontally diﬀerentiated) product may or may
not be discovered, depending on the amount of R&D investments incurred. We assume
that ﬁrm 1 faces competition from a potential entrant — ﬁrm 2 — in the race to discover
the new drug.
12Another related study is Matraves (1999), who provides a detailed description of the relationships
between advertising, R&D and market concentration in the pharmaceutical industry.
13Generic drugs are chemically identical products to the original brand-name drug. However, all the
mentioned empirical studies strongly suggest that generics are not de facto perfect substitutes to the original
brand-name drug. It turns out that a vertical diﬀerentiation model, where the generics are perceived to be
of lower quality than the brand-name drug, produces results that ﬁt the empirical observations well (see,
e.g., Cabrales, 2003, Königbauer, 2007, Brekke et al., 2007).
7We consider a two-period model with the following sequence of events:
Stage 1a: The incumbent advertises and sells the existing drug.
Stage 1b: The incumbent and the potential entrant simultaneously invest in R&D to
develop a new drug.
Stage 2: The new drug — if discovered — is advertised by the patent holder and sold in
the market alongside the already existing drug.
Stages 1a and 1b constitute the ﬁrst period, where the incumbent is a monopolist in
the market. The breakthrough product (drug 1) is sold in both periods, whereas the new
product (drug 2) — if discovered — is sold in the second period only. Thus, while the ﬁrst-
period is a single-product monopoly phase, the second period is characterised by one of
three diﬀerent market structures: (i) a single-product monopoly if neither ﬁrm discovers
the second product; (ii) a multi-product monopoly if the incumbent wins the R&D race;
and (iii) a duopoly if the entrant wins the R&D race.
Drug demand
Demand for prescription drugs is typically highly price-inelastic, mainly due to third-
party payment (i.e., insurance) for drug consumption.14 We make the assumption that
drug demand is perfectly price-inelastic and depends only on the amounts of advertising for
the existing drugs within the therapeutic market. Let Ai denote the amount of advertising
for drug i. The demand for this drug in the second period i sg i v e nb yaf u n c t i o nDi (Ai,A j),
where ∂Di/∂Ai > 0, ∂2Di/∂A2
i ≤ 0, ∂Di/∂Aj < 0,a n d∂Di/∂Ai > |∂Dj/∂Ai|.15 These
assumptions on the demand function imply that advertising has both a market expanding
14Patients often pay a ﬁxed deductible or a ﬂat fee per prescription irrespective of which prescription
drug they choose. Even if they pay coinsurance, the rate is very low, resulting in low price elasticity.
Moreover, the physicians may also be ignorant of prices when prescribing drugs. As a result, demand for
prescription drugs is highly price inelastic. For empirical evidence on price elasticities, see, e.g., Newhouse
(1993), Rizzo (1999) and Scherer (2000).
15Demand can be positive even without any advertising, i.e., D(0) = D,w h e r eD reﬂects a ﬁxed baseline
demand. The size of D does not matter for the analysis; the important assumption is that advertising is
the only instrument the ﬁr m sc a nu s et oi n ﬂuence demand.
8and a business stealing eﬀect.16,17 For simplicity, we assume that demand is equal in both
periods, implying that ﬁrst-period demand is given by D1 (A1,0).
Advertising
A key assumption in our analysis is that the eﬀects of advertising persist over time.
As is common in the literature on strategic advertising, we take this assumption to the
extreme by letting the eﬀects of advertising on demand be inﬁnitely durable.18 The ﬁrm
producing drug i can invest in an advertising stock Ai for this product at a cost K (Ai),
where K0 (Ai) > 0, K00 (Ai) > 0 and K (0) = 0. Thus, we assume that both ﬁrms possess
the same advertising technology.
R&D
During the monopoly phase, the incumbent and the potential entrant compete in
terms of R&D to develop a new (horizontally diﬀerentiated) drug in the market. Game-
theoretically, we assume that R&D investments are made simultaneously and non-cooperatively.
If we denote the amount of R&D investment of ﬁrm i by xi, the probability of success for
ﬁrm i in the R&D contest is given by a function zi (xi,x j). By ‘success’ we mean that
ﬁrm i will develop and obtain a patent for the new drug. We assume that z1 + z2 ≤ 1,
accommodating the possibility that the new drug will not be developed. The R&D success
function is assumed to have the following general properties: ∂zi/∂xi > 0, ∂zi/∂xj < 0,
∂2zi/∂x2
i ≤ 0, ∂2zi/∂x2
j ≥ 0 and ∂zi/∂xi > |∂zi/∂xj|. The last assumption essentially
means that increased R&D eﬀort by either ﬁrm will always increase the overall probabil-
16This is in line with the empirical study by Berndt et al. (1995) of the H2-antagonist market, showing
that drug marketing is neither purely business-stealing nor purely market-expanding, but somewhere in
between.
17The strategic eﬀect of advertising is related to the business-stealing eﬀect. If ∂Di/∂Aj =0 ,t h e n
the incumbent cannot aﬀect the ex post proﬁts of the entrant, and advertising has no strategic eﬀect.
Thus, advertising has a pure (non-strategic) demand eﬀect, i.e., ∂Di/∂Ai > 0,a n ds t r a t e g i ce ﬀect, i.e.,
∂Di/∂Aj < 0.
18See, e.g., Schmalensee (1983), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), etc. See
also Brekke and Kuhn (2006) for an application to the pharmaceutical industry. As will be discussed
in Section 6, our results only need some degree of advertising persistence. The assumption of inﬁnite
durability is just a simpliﬁcation, making the analysis more tractable.
9ity that a new drug is developed. The cost of exerting an R&D eﬀort of xi i sg i v e nb ya
function C (xi),w h e r eC0 (xi) > 0, C00 (xi) > 0 and C (0) = 0.
Proﬁts
As already mentioned, markets for prescription drugs are predominantly characterised
by highly price inelastic demand, mainly due to extensive third-party payment and highly
asymmetric information in the physician-patient relationship. As a consequence, prescrip-
tion drugs are, in most countries, subject to some kind of price regulation. In the present
model, we therefore make the assumption that the ﬁrms face exogenous drug prices, which
seems a reasonable approximation to the above mentioned particular features. More specif-
ically, we assume that the ﬁrms face a regulated drug price p, which — for simplicity — is
assumed to be equal for both drugs.19 Notice that, since demand is insensitive to price
changes, a price increase is equivalent to a demand increase. Thus, an increase in p can
also be interpreted as being equivalent to an increase in the patent length. Whether we
use this interpretation, or explicitly acknowledge that the regulated drug price is an inte-
gral part of patent protection for pharmaceuticals, we can think of p as representing the
‘generosity’ of the patent system.
We abstract from production costs once a new drug has been developed, implying that
all costs of the pharmaceutical ﬁrms are related to marketing and R&D. In line with the
speciﬁc features of the pharmaceutical industry — where marginal production costs are
very low — we also disregard the possibility of capacity constraints, and assume that ﬁrms
will always supply the quantity demanded, as long as the price covers marginal production
costs (i.e., p ≥ 0).
Second period proﬁts for ﬁrm i in market structure t is denoted V t
i ,w h e r ei =1 ,2,
and t = S(ingle-product monopoly), M(ulti-product monopoly), D(uopoly). Assuming
dynamic consistency, i.e., that the incumbent has no incentive to increase advertising of
19Equal prices for both drugs might be a reasonable assumption in the case of horizontally diﬀerentiated
drugs with equivalent therapeutic beneﬁts. In the last section of the paper, we brieﬂyd i s c u s sh o wd i ﬀerent
drug prices might aﬀect our results.
10the original product ex post, second period proﬁts are given by20
V S
1 = pD1 (A1,0), (1)
V M
1 = p[D1 (A1,A 2)+D2 (A1,A 2)] − K (A2), (2)
V D
1 = pD1 (A1,A 2), (3)
V D
2 = pD2 (A1,A 2) − K (A2). (4)
Since the market structure in the second period depends on the outcome of the R&D
contest, expected second period proﬁts for ﬁrm i, denoted Bi,a r eg i v e nb y
B1 =[ 1− z1 (x1,x 2) − z2 (x1,x 2)]V S
1 + z1 (x1,x 2)V M
1 + z2 (x1,x 2)V D
1 − C (x1), (5)
B2 = z2 (x1,x 2)V D
2 − C (x2). (6)
Abstracting from discounting, expected present-value proﬁts for the incumbent ﬁrm at
the outset of the game, denoted Π1, are consequently given by21
Π1 = V S
1 + B1 − K (A1). (7)
3A n a l y s i s
We look for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the above described game, solving
the model by backwards induction. We start, then, by analysing second-period advertising
of the new product: drug 2.
20In this model, dynamic consistency is always satisﬁed under reasonable assumption. We qualify this
claim in Section 4, when discussing optimal ﬁrst-period advertising incentives.
21We could have introduced a discount factor δ ∈ [0,1] on second-period proﬁts, but this only complicates
the analysis, without providing any qualitatively diﬀerent results. For simplicity, we therefore assume δ =1 .
113.1 Second-period advertising
The introduction of a new product gives rise to one of potentially two new market struc-
tures, depending on which ﬁrm develops the new product:22
Duopoly
If the entrant obtains the patent for the new product, it chooses a level of advertising,
AD
2 , that maximises proﬁts for ﬁrm 2, given by (4). The ﬁrst-order condition for optimal
advertising of the new product deﬁnes a best response function AD
2 (A1). It is straight-
forward to derive that ∂AD
2 (A1)/∂A1 < 0 if ∂2D2/∂A1∂A2 < 0. In this case the decision
variables are strategic substitutes23, implying that increased ﬁrst-period advertising by the
incumbent will reduce the optimal second-period advertising by the entrant.
Monopoly
If the new product is developed by the incumbent, the optimal level of advertising
for this product, AM
2 , maximises the incumbent’s second-period proﬁts, given by (2).
The ﬁrst-order condition deﬁnes a best response function AM
2 (A1). It is straightforward
to verify that the multi-product monopolist internalises the business-stealing eﬀect of
advertising, implying that AM
2 (A1) <A D
2 (A1). Furthermore, as in the duopoly case, we
ﬁnd that ∂AM
2 (A1)/∂A1 < 0 if ∂2Di/∂Ai∂Aj < 0.
For the remainder of the analysis, we will generally assume that advertising investments
are strategic substitutes for the ﬁrms.
3.2 The eﬀects of ﬁrst-period advertising on second-period proﬁts
By inserting the equilibrium levels of second-period advertising in the second-period proﬁt
expressions, (1)-(4), we derive equilibrium second-period proﬁts for ﬁrm i in market struc-
ture t as a function of ﬁrst-period advertising for the incumbent product; V t
i (A1).T h e
properties of the demand functions — where advertising has both a market expanding
22Details of the calculations in this subsection are given in the Appendix.
23See Bulow et al. (1985).






In words: for any level of ﬁrst-period advertising, the introduction of a new drug in
the therapeutic market is beneﬁcial for the incumbent if the drug is developed by the
incumbent himself, but detrimental for the incumbent if the drug is developed by a new
entrant.
A key mechanism of the model is that ﬁrst-period advertising by the incumbent aﬀects

















First-period advertising by the incumbent directly reduces the second-period payoﬀ of the
entrant. In addition, if advertising decisions are strategic substitutes, the incumbent has
a strategic ﬁrst-mover advantage which enables him to shift second period duopoly rents
f r o mt h ep o s s i b l ee n t r a n tt h r o u g hﬁrst-period advertising.

















The latter inequality implies that ﬁrst-period advertising has a larger positive eﬀect on
the incumbent’s second-period proﬁts in duopoly than in multi-product monopoly. This
follows from the internalisation of the business-stealing eﬀect in multi-product monopoly
(i.e., ∂Di/∂Aj < 0)a n dt h eﬁrst-mover advantage vis-à-vis the entrant in duopoly (i.e.,
∂AD
2 /∂A1 < 0). This particular relationship between the marginal second-period eﬀects
of ﬁrst-period advertising will prove crucial in the subsequent analysis.
24See the Appendix for details.
133.3 R&D competition
During the monopoly phase, the incumbent and a potential entrant compete in terms
of R&D to develop a new, horizontally diﬀerentiated, drug in the market. For a given
level of advertising by the incumbent, each ﬁrm chooses the level of R&D that maximises
expected second-period payoﬀs, anticipating the equilibrium second-period outcome. Ex-
pected second-period proﬁts are given by (5) and (6). For illustrative purposes, it may be
useful to re-arrange the expression for the incumbent’s expected second-period proﬁts in
the following way:
B1 = V S
1 + z1 (x1,x 2)
£
V M





− z2 (x1,x 2)
£
V S





− C (x1). (11)
Thus, the incentive for the incumbent to undertake R&D investments can be decomposed
into two diﬀerent factors: (i) the proﬁt gain derived from winning the R&D competition,
and (ii) the proﬁt loss of losing the R&D competition.25
From (6) and (11), equilibrium R&D eﬀorts by the two ﬁr m sa r eg i v e nb yt h es o l u t i o n

































Our assumptions on zi (·) and C (·) ensure that the second-order conditions are met.
We also assume that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is positive, guaranteeing
uniqueness of the equilibrium.26
25Beath et al. (1989) label the ﬁrst eﬀect as the ‘proﬁt incentive’ and the second eﬀect as the ‘competitive
threat’. These also correspond to the ‘replacement eﬀect’ and the ‘eﬃciency eﬀect’ in Gilbert and Newberry
(1982) and Reinganum (1983).
26See the Appendix for details.
143.4 The eﬀects of ﬁrst-period advertising on R&D incentives
The ﬁrst-order conditions (12)-(13) implicitly deﬁne the optimal R&D eﬀorts of ﬁrm 1 and
2 as functions of the ﬁrst-period investment level by the incumbent: x∗
1 (A1) and x∗
2 (A1),
respectively. The relationship between ﬁrst-period advertising and R&D incentives is
characterised as follows:
Proposition 1 Assume that advertising investments are strategic substitutes for the ﬁrms;
∂2Di(Ai,Aj)




∂A1 < 0 if













∂xi∂xj ≥ 0 or





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ is suﬃciently small.
A proof is given in the Appendix.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition establishes the conditions for advertising and R&D
being substitute strategies for the incumbent ﬁrm, implying that more resources spent on
advertising will lead to less resources spent on R&D. This will be the case if advertising
investments are strategic substitutes and the second-order cross derivatives of the inno-
vation success functions are suﬃciently small in absolute value in equilibrium.27 If these
conditions are met, increased advertising by the incumbent will also dampen the potential
entrant’s R&D incentives, as conﬁrmed by the second part of the proposition.
The intuition for these results follow from a combination of direct and indirect eﬀects.
An increase in ﬁrst-period advertising by the incumbent has a direct and (potentially) an
indirect eﬀect on R&D eﬀorts of both ﬁrms, and the sign of the overall eﬀect is generally
ambiguous in both cases. The direct eﬀects of increased advertising are unambiguously
negative with respect to R&D eﬀorts for both ﬁrms. Increased advertising by the incum-
bent directly reduces the second-period payoﬀ of ﬁrm 2 and thus reduces the incentives
for the potential entrant to exert eﬀort in the R&D contest. Increased advertising for the
existing product also directly reduces the incentives to invest in R&D for the incumbent,
27Notice that this is also the condition, in qualitative terms, for a positive Jacobian determinant. See
the Appendix for further details.
15because such advertising reduces the gain of winning the contest by more than a potential
increase in the loss of losing.28
If ∂2zi/∂xi∂xj =0 , the direct eﬀects unambiguously ensure that increased advertising
of the breakthrough product will reduce the R&D incentives for both ﬁrms. However,
if ∂2zi/∂xi∂xj 6=0there are additional indirect eﬀects that could work in the opposite
direction. A lower amount of R&D by ﬁrm i could — ceteris paribus — spur increased R&D
investments by ﬁrm j if R&D eﬀorts are strategic substitutes; that is, if ∂2zi/∂xi∂xj < 0.
Since the condition for the second part of the proposition is less restrictive than for
the ﬁrst part, the following implication also holds:
Corollary 1 Increased ﬁrst-period advertising by the incumbent reduces the probability
that a new product is developed and introduced on the market if ∂2Di/∂Ai∂Aj < 0 and
¯ ¯∂2zi/∂xi∂xj
¯ ¯ is suﬃciently small.
3.5 First-period advertising
At the outset of the game, the incumbent chooses the optimal level of advertising for the
existing patented drug by maximising expected present-value proﬁts over the two periods,
given by (7), anticipating the outcome of the R&D game and the subsequent market
equilibria in the second period. Thus, optimal ﬁrst-period advertising is given by
A∗





2 (A1),A 1) − K (A1)
ª
. (14)
As a benchmark for comparison, we start out by considering the case of exogenous
probabilities of second-period market structures. In this case, the ﬁrst-order condition for





























When deciding the optimal level of ﬁrst-period advertising, the incumbent has to consider
28This follows from (10).
16the marginal second-period beneﬁts of increased advertising in the diﬀerent market struc-
tures, and weigh these net beneﬁts with the relevant probabilities. Here we see what it
takes to ensure dynamic consistency. Since the eﬀect of advertising is (by assumption) inﬁ-
nitely durable, and since the incumbent’s returns from advertising occur over two periods,
the optimal level of ﬁrst-period advertising will, under reasonable asssumptions, be such
that the incumbent has no incentive to increase advertising of drug 1 in the second-period.
This holds true unless advertising incentives in duopoly (given by ∂V D
1 /A1) are extremely
strong, implying that ∂2Di/∂Ai∂Aj is very large in absolute value.29
I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w ed e ﬁne overinvestment in advertising as an advertising level in
excess of the level given by the above benchmark. In other words, we say that an incumbent
ﬁrm overinvests in advertising if it advertises more than it would have done if advertising
and R&D decisions were unrelated, implying that the R&D probabilities (z1 and z2)w e r e
exogenous with respect to the ﬁrst-period advertising decision.
Let us now turn to the case of endogenous probabilities, determined by the absolute
and relative R&D eﬀorts of the ﬁrms. From (14), the ﬁrst-order condition for an optimal
level of ﬁrst-period advertising can be conceptualised and expressed as follows:
∂Π1 (A1)
∂A1
= Direct rent eﬀect + Strategic R&D eﬀect =0 , (16)
where the Direct rent eﬀect is equal to the left-hand side of (15), whereas the Strategic





















Since the expression in square brackets is unambiguously negative, it follows that the
Strategic R&D eﬀect is positive if and only if ∂x∗
2/∂A1 < 0.S i n c e o u r d e ﬁnition of
overinvestment is equivalent to a positive Strategic R&D eﬀect, the following result follows
immediately:
29In the parametric example presented in the next section, dynamic consistency is ensured by a wide
margin.
17Proposition 2 The incumbent ﬁrm optimally overinvests in advertising if and only if
such advertising reduces the R&D eﬀort of the potential entrant.
As we can see from (17), the gain for the incumbent of inducing a lower R&D eﬀort from
the potential entrant — which provides the incentives for overinvestment — is constituted
by two parts. A lower value of x∗
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is reduced. Thus, as long as ﬁrst-period advertising by the incumbent reduces R&D eﬀorts
by the potential entrant, with the relevant conditions given in Proposition 1, incentives
for overinvestment are present.
4 Some welfare and policy implications
In this section of the paper, we assess the welfare properties of the equilibrium derived
above. We restrict attention to the ﬁrst-period advertising decision and ask how the in-
cumbent’s advertising incentives correspond to the ones of a social planner, taking the
subsequent R&D decisions as given, and under which circumstances restrictions on mar-
keting activities might be justiﬁed.30
Advertising and welfare is often a methodologically complicated issue, in particular
if advertising contains elements of persuasion, which may potentially change individuals’
preferences. In most cases, advertising contains elements of both information and per-
suasion. In the pharmaceutical market, for instance, sales representatives may inform the
physician about the existence and the characteristics of a new drug, but at the same time
sponsor conference trips, oﬀer gifts, free samples, etc., which may be of a more persuasive
n a t u r e . F r o mav i e w p o i n to fs o c i a lw e l f a r e ,informational advertising brings an obvious
social beneﬁt in the sense that a larger fraction of consumers (physicians) becomes aware
30In most countries there exists a wide set of restrictions on drug marketing. For instance, direct-to-
consumer advertising of prescription drugs is prohibited in almost every western country, except for the
US and New Zealand. Moreover, there exist ethical guidelines regulating the interaction between medical
doctors and sales representatives from the pharmaceutical companies. Health authorities also usually
require that a disclaimer stating the eﬀectiveness, side-eﬀects, contraindications, etc., is printed along with
an advertisement of a drug.
18of a product that may yield a positive net utility if consumed. On the other hand, the
potential for socially beneﬁcial persuasive advertising is far less obvious.
When evaluating welfare eﬀects, we make use of the standard welfare measure: the
sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus net of third party payments. Assuming that
third-party funds can be raised in a non-distortionary manner, the social welfare function
simpliﬁes to (gross) aggregate consumer utility net of R&D and marketing costs. Since
the outcome of the R&D competition is uncertain, the relevant measure of social welfare
is in expected terms.
Let Ut (A1) denote aggregate consumer utility in market structure t = S,M,D.F u r -











as aggregate utility net of second-period advertising costs in the market
structures with successful innovation. Expected social welfare, as a function of ﬁrst-period
advertising, is then given by31
W (A1)=US (A1)+[ 1− z1 (A1) − z2 (A1)]US (A1)+z1 (A1) b UM (A1) (18)
+z2 (A1) b UD (A1) − C (x1 (A1)) − C2 (x1 (A1)) − K (A1).
In the subsequent analysis, we make the following assumptions:
1. The conditions stated in Proposition 1 are satisﬁed; i.e., ∂x∗
1/∂A1 < 0 and ∂x∗
2/∂A1 <
0.
2. Aggregate consumer utility is weakly increasing in advertising, and is always higher
with two drugs on the market; i.e., ∂Ut/∂A1 ≥ 0 for t = S,M,D,a n dUt >U S for
t = M,D.
3. The welfare function is concave in A1.
Let us ﬁrst characterise the socially optimal (second-best) level of ﬁrst-period adver-
tising, taking into account the subsequent eﬀects on R&D investments and (possible)
31Notice that, to save notation, we write zi (A1): =zi (x1 (A1),x 2 (A1)), i =1 ,2.
19second-period advertising of the new drug. Taking the ﬁrst-order derivative of W with
respect to A1 yields
∂W (A1)
∂A1






















































The interpretation of this expression, consisting of six terms, is reasonably straightforward.
The ﬁrst four terms represent the eﬀect of increased advertising on consumer utility (net
of advertising costs) in each possible market structure, weighted by the respective prob-
abilities. The next two terms represent the expected utility loss, net of R&D costs (and
second-period advertising costs), of a lower probability of drug innovation, due to the ad-
verse eﬀect of advertising on R&D eﬀort. This eﬀect would be zero at the point where R&D
investment are at the socially optimal (ﬁrst-best) level. The socially optimal (second-best)
level of advertising balances these eﬀects to the point where ∂W (A1)/∂A1 =0 .
In order to assess the welfare properties of the equilibrium derived in the previous
section, we can evaluate the above expression at the equilibrium, A∗
1, which is implicitly
given by (15)-(17). By substituting for ∂K/∂A1 at the optimal level A∗
1, and rearranging,






































































































20This expression gives the diﬀerence between social and private marketing incentives (in a
second-best context). If ∂W (A∗
1)/∂A1 < 0 the incumbent invest too much in advertising,
while the opposite holds true if ∂W (A∗
1)/∂A1 > 0. The diﬀerence between social and
private incentives is essentially made up of three diﬀerent components. The ﬁrst three
terms in (20) represent the diﬀerence between marginal consumer utility and marginal
second-period proﬁts in each of the possible market structures, weighted by probabilities.
The subsequent two terms have been discussed before, while the ﬁnal term is what we
have dubbed the Strategic R&D eﬀect of the incumbent.
Under which circumstances will the incumbent advertise more than the socially optimal
level? In other words, when is ∂W (A1)/∂A1|A1=A∗
1 < 0? One key factor is the extent
to which advertising is persuasive (as opposed to informative). If we take an "objective
welfare" perspective, the degree of persuasiveness should be reﬂected in the size of the
marginal utility of advertising; ∂Ut/∂A1.F r o mt h eﬁrst three terms of (20) we see that
the less informative advertising is (i.e., the lower the marginal utility of advertising is),
the more likely it is that the whole expression is negative, implying a socially excessive
level of advertising in equilibrium.
Another key factor is the strength of patent protection, measured by the parame-
ter p. This enters directly in the ﬁrst three terms, and in the last term, of (20). It is
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt ov e r i f yt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei np increases the marginal proﬁt gain of ad-
vertising, ∂V t/∂A1, t = S,M,D, and also increases the proﬁtd i ﬀerentials
¡
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¢
. In other words, stronger patent protection not only increases advertising
incentives for given R&D levels (ﬁrst three terms), it also increases incentives for strategic
advertising to reduce R&D investments (last term). A change in p has also indirect eﬀects
through changes in ∂x∗
1/∂A1 and ∂x∗
2/∂A1, which are generally diﬃcult to characterise.
However, under the assumption that the ﬁrst-order eﬀects dominate the second-order ones,
we see that — all else equal — stronger patent protection increases the likelihood of advertis-
ing being at a socially excessive level in equilibrium. This conclusion implies that stricter
regulation of drug marketing (i.e., reducing A∗
1) and a less generous patent policy/stricter
21price regulation (i.e., reducing p) are policy substitutes.
5 An example: Informative advertising
In this section we illustrate our model by analysing a standard speciﬁc advertising model
that ﬁts the assumptions of the general model. We consider an informative advertising
model with an information technology that follows Butters (1977).33 There is a unit mass
of potential consumers that are ex ante uninformed about the existence of the products
in the market, and rely on advertising to become informed. If a consumer receives one or
more ads for a particular product, she knows about the existence and attributes of this
product. We assume unit demand, where informed consumers buy one unit in each period.
With two products in the market, consumers who are informed about both products buy
either product with probability 1/2.34 If a fraction Ai (Aj) of consumers are informed
about drug i (j), second-period demand for drug i is given by
Di (Ai,A j)=Ai (1 − Aj)+
AiAj
2
,i , j =1 ,2; i 6= j. (21)
Notice that ∂2Di/∂Ai∂Aj = −1/2, implying that advertising choices are strategic substi-
tutes for the ﬁrms. We assume that a ﬁrm can inform a fraction Ai of the consumers about
the existence and attributes of drug i by incurring a cost of K (Ai)=k
2A2
i, Ai ∈ [0,1].W e
can now use these parameterised demand and cost functions to calculate second-period
payoﬀs in the diﬀerent market structures.35
In order to obtain analytical solutions in the R&D contest, we construct the success
functions in the following way. Let xi ∈ [0,1] denote the probability that ﬁrm i discovers
the new product. If the product is only discovered by ﬁrm i,t h i sﬁrm will be granted a
patent for the product. However, if both ﬁrms discover the product, the patent will be
33This approach has been widely used in the advertising literature. See, e.g., Schmalensee (1983),
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Ishigaki (2000), Brekke and Kuhn (2006).
34We can interpret this as a Hotelling model with uniform distribution of consumers, symmetric location
of products and ads reaching consumers randomly.
35The explicit expressions are given in the Appendix.
22granted to either ﬁrm with probability 1
2. This yields the following success functions:36
zi (xi,x j)=xi (1 − xj)+
xixj
2
,i , j =1 ,2; i 6= j. (22)
We assume that ﬁrm i can obtain a probability xi of discovery by undertaking an R&D
investment of C (xi)=c
2x2
i, xi ∈ [0,1].
5.1 Equilibrium analysis
We can insert these functional expressions into (6) and (11), and solve for the optimal
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128c2k2 − p4 [2 − 3A1 (2 − A1)](2 − A1)
2. (24)
An interior solution requires a lower bound on the cost parameter c. It is relatively
straightforward to verify that c>c:= p2/4k is a suﬃcient condition for x∗
1 (A1),x ∗
2 (A1) ∈
(0,1) for A1 ∈ [0,1]. From (23)-(24) we derive:
Proposition 3 In the informative advertising model, given that c>c ,t h e n
(i) x∗
1 = x∗
2 if A1 =0 ,
(ii) x∗
1 <x ∗




∂A1 < 0 for any A1 ∈ [0,1] and i =1 ,2.
A proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that the incumbent will invest less aggressively in R&D than the
potential entrant. While the entrant’s R&D incentives are determined by the possibility
of duopoly proﬁt only, the incumbent balances the proﬁt gain of winning the R&D com-
petition against the proﬁt loss of losing the R&D competition. Since the incumbent has









23already secured some proﬁts, due to being a single-product monopolist in the ﬁrst period,
the net gain of winning the R&D competition is lower than for the entrant. However,
in the extreme case of no ﬁrst-period advertising, both ﬁrms will invest equally much in
R & D .T h er e a s o ni ss i m p l yt h a tf o rA1 =0 , single-product monopoly proﬁts are also zero,
implying that the incumbent and the entrant face identical expected proﬁt gains from
winning from the R&D competition.
The proposition also conﬁrms that the general conditions given in Proposition 1 are
always satisﬁed in the informative advertising model, implying that marketing and R&D
are substitute strategies for the incumbent, and a lower level of ﬁrst-period advertising
will increase overall R&D expenditures. By combining Propositions 2 and 3, we also see
that the informative advertising model yields strategic overinvestment in advertising by
the incumbent.
Turning now to the ﬁrst-period advertising decision and the equilibrium outcome of
the full game, the complexity of the model makes analytical solutions infeasible. Instead,
we present the results in the form of numerical examples.37 Tables 1—3 report equilibrium
values of ﬁrst-period advertising and R&D investments for diﬀerent values of the key pa-
rameters k, c and p. In Table 4, we present measures of the incumbent’s incentives to use
advertising strategically in order to aﬀect R&D expenditures. We do so by evaluating the
Strategic R&D eﬀect,d e ﬁned by (17), in equilibrium, which measures the degree of overin-
vestment in ﬁrst-period advertising. Table 4 reveals that the incentives for overinvestment
are increasing in p and decreasing in k and c.
37It is straightforward to verify that the model is dynamically consistent. In the informative advertising










p k =1 0 k =1 5 k =1 0 k =1 5
1 0.200 0.133 0.200 0.133
2 0.396 0.264 0.398 0.265
3 0.596 0.394 0.599 0.397





p k =1 0 k =1 5 k =1 0 k =1 5
1 0.062 0.049 0.032 0.025
2 0.144 0.137 0.072 0.070
3 0.193 0.215 0.085 0.108





p k =1 0 k =1 5 k =1 0 k =1 5
1 0.079 0.057 0.040 0.029
2 0.239 0.187 0.124 0.097
3 0.401 0.345 0.212 0.182
4 0.499 0.498 0.273 0.270
Table 4: Strategic R&D eﬀect.
c = 1
2 c =1
p k =1 0 k =1 5 k =1 0 k =1 5
1 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.018 0.007 0.010 0.003
3 0.086 0.036 0.051 0.021
4 0.234 0.105 0.156 0.067
Although we restrict ourselves to a relatively small set of numerical examples, several
regularities can be identiﬁed that shed some light on the mechanisms of the model.38 We
concentrate here on the eﬀects of prices and costs on ﬁrst-period advertising and R&D
expenditures. Consider ﬁrst the eﬀects of an increase in marketing costs (k). This always
leads to a reduction of ﬁrst-period advertising, through the direct cost eﬀect. R&D eﬀorts
are ambiguously aﬀected, though, due to an interaction of two opposing eﬀects. Ceteris
paribus, reduced ﬁrst-period advertising increases R&D incentives, as we have analysed in
great detail in Section 4.4. However, higher advertising costs also reduce second-period
proﬁts, since the new product has to be advertised. This will — all else equal — reduce
R&D incentives. From our numerical examples, we observe that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates
only for relatively high values of p, and with respect to the incumbent’s R&D incentives.
38Other simulations with diﬀerent parameter values yield a qualitatively similar picture.
25Increased R&D costs (c) reduce R&D eﬀorts directly, but the eﬀect on ﬁrst-period
advertising is ambiguous. We see that, for most of the reported parameter values, ad-
vertising investments will increase (although by quite small amounts). In our examples,
the exception is for the combination of high price and low advertising costs. In this case
the incumbent has very strong incentives to advertise in order to protect his monopoly
position (which is very proﬁtable due to the high price), and these incentives are partic-
ularly strong for low R&D costs, which (all else equal) increases the probability that a
competitor will enter the market.
More interesting, perhaps, are the eﬀects of a higher drug price (p). A price increase
will increase ﬁrst-period advertising simply because it makes the monopoly position more
valuable for the incumbent patent holder. Consequently, the incumbent will have stronger
incentives to use advertising strategically in order to protect his monopoly rent. Never-
theless, the potential entrant will react to a higher price by increasing his R&D eﬀorts.
This is due to the fact that a higher price not only increases the value of the existent
patent, it also increases the value of obtaining the second patent in the market. Thus,
the increased advertising eﬀorts by the incumbent have only a dampening eﬀect on the
competitor’s R&D expenditures. The eﬀect of a higher price on the incumbent’s R&D
eﬀorts is ambiguous, though. Ceteris paribus, more advertising of the existing product
will reduce the incumbent’s incentives for R&D. However, a higher p also increases the
value of the contested prize, which — all else equal — leads to increased R&D eﬀorts by
both ﬁrms. From Table 2 we see that the second eﬀect always dominates when advertising
costs are high, implying that it is more costly to use advertising as a means to reduce
R&D investments. On the other hand, for the combination of low advertising costs and
high R&D costs, there is a hump-shaped relationship between p and x∗
1.F o ras u ﬃciently
high price, a further price increase will trigger an increase in advertising that is suﬃciently
strong to reduce the incumbent’s R&D investments.
In our numerical examples, although the incumbent’s R&D eﬀorts may decrease, ag-
gregate R&D expenditures always increase as a result of a higher price. This is conﬁrmed
26by comparing Tables 2 and 3. However, a higher price — or, generally, a more generous
patent protection — implies that a larger share of the patent rent is spent on marketing,
relative to R&D. This is a key result. Indeed, we see from Tables 2 and 3 that raising
p above a certain level has a very modest eﬀect on aggregate R&D expenditures, while
incentives for advertising increase considerably.
5.2 Welfare implications
We can derive welfare implications from the informative advertising example by using
the Hotelling interpretation of the model, with linear transportation costs, where the two
drugs are located at the endpoints of the Hotelling line. Let v denote the gross utility of
consuming a drug, while τ is the cost per unit distance between the actually consumed
drug and the consumer’s ‘ideal’ drug. Whereas v can be interpreted as the eﬀectiveness
of the drug treatment, τ can be interpreted as a measure of potential side-eﬀects and
contraindications. We also assume full market coverage, i.e., no consumers refrain from
buying the existing product(s).
It is now straightforward to derive the expressions for ex post consumer utility in the
diﬀerent potential market structures.39 For simplicity, we assume full third-party payment
of drugs.40,41
39The explicit expressions are given in the Appendix.
40Since social welfare does not depend on prices, the assumption of full third-party payment makes the
exposition easier without aﬀecting the result.
41With full third-party payment, the assumption of full market coverage is equivalent to imposing a
restriction v − τ ≥ 0.
27Table 5: The socially optimal level of A1
c = 1
2 c =1
p k =1 0 k =1 5 k =1 0 k =1 5
1 0.498 0.332 0.499 0.333
2 0.490 0.328 0.495 0.331
3 0.491 0.328 0.495 0.330
4 0.511 0.338 0.511 0.338
Other parameter values: v =3 ,τ=1
The socially optimal level of ﬁrst-period advertising is reported in Table 5, for diﬀerent
numerical values of the key parameters. The numerical values are identical to the ones
previously chosen, so that we can make a straightforward comparison between the equi-
librium values of advertising (Table 1) and the socially optimal ones (Table 5). The only
general picture that appears from this numerical example is that the socially optimal level
of advertising is inversely proportional to the direct advertising costs. The parameters
p and c have minimal inﬂuence on the socially optimal level of advertising. In relation
to the general discussion of private versus social advertising incentives in Section 4, this
conﬁrms that any second-order eﬀects of an increase in p (through changes in ∂x∗
1/∂A1
and ∂x∗
2/∂A1) is by far outweighed by the ﬁrst-order eﬀects through the incumbent’s in-
creased proﬁt incentives for advertising; i.e., the increase in ∂V t/∂A1,
¡
V M






1 − V D
1
¢
. Thus, when comparing Table 1 and Table 5, the picture is very clear: In
equilibrium, ﬁrst-period advertising is excessively high for suﬃciently high values of p,
regardless of advertising or R&D costs. This conﬁrms our conclusion that stricter reg-
ulation of drug marketing and a stricter patent policy are policy substitutes. In other
words, even in a setting where advertising is purely informational, our results suggest that
a generous patent (or price regulation) system should be matched with strict regulation
on advertising, and vice versa.
286C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper we have analysed how a patent-holding pharmaceutical ﬁrm may strategically
use advertising ex ante to aﬀect R&D investments in new drugs, and thereby change the
probability distribution of future market structures. In doing so, we have explored the
basic idea that a generous patent system may provide incentives for patent-holding ﬁrms
not only to spend resources on R&D to obtain new patents, but also to spend resources
on marketing to protect existing patents. In this ﬁnal section of the paper, we will not
recapitulate our results in detail, but instead provide some discussion of a couple of key
assumptions.
While the assumption of drug demand being insensitive to prices is appropriate for
most pharmaceutical markets, the additional simplifying assumption that the price is equal
for the old and new drug in the therapeutic market is not so obvious. However, while a
relaxation of this assumption is likely to aﬀect the relative strength of R&D and marketing
incentives, it does not aﬀect the main mechanisms of the model. A higher expected price
for the new drug will — all else equal — stimulate R&D incentives for both ﬁrms. This
suggests that it might be relatively less important for the incumbent to spend resources
on marketing in order to protect the existing patent rent. However, a higher price for
the new product also means that a potential entrant — if successful in obtaining the new
patent — will advertise this drug more heavily in the second-period duopoly, which, in turn,
increases the incumbent’s loss in case of entry. Consequently, this gives the incumbent a
stronger incentive — all else equal — to use ﬁrst-period advertising as a strategic instrument
in order to reduce the probability of incurring such a loss. The relative strength of these
eﬀects is a priori uncertain.
The analysis rests on the crucial assumption that the eﬀect of advertising persists over
time. If this was not the case, there would be no demand-side link between marketing
and R&D, and the two decision variables would be strategically independent. While the
standard assumption in the strategic advertising literature — that the eﬀect of advertis-
ing is inﬁnitely durable — is obviously unrealistically strong when taken literally, it may
29nevertheless be a useful simpliﬁcation that captures an important aspect of advertising.
In reality, the eﬀects of advertising are neither completely instantaneous nor inﬁnitely
durable, but somewhere in between. The question is rather how strong the persistence
eﬀect is. The basic idea explored in our analysis only requires that there is, to a certain
degree, a persistence eﬀect. Obviously, the weaker this persistence eﬀe c ti s ,t h em o r ec o s t l y
it is for the incumbent ﬁrm to use ﬁrst-period advertising strategically in order to aﬀect
R&D expenditures and thereby the probabilities of second-period market structures.
Finally, it should be mentioned that we have focused on non-drastic innovations. A
natural extension of the model would be to allow the ﬁrms also to choose drastic innova-
tions (i.e., discovery of completely new products) and analyse the choice between drastic
and non-drastic innovations. This is a topic for further research.
30Appendix
The eﬀects of ﬁrst-period advertising on second-period proﬁts
The ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal second-period advertising in market structures





















Comparing (A1) and (A2), it is clear that AM
2 (A1) <A D
2 (A1). Totally diﬀerentiating
these ﬁrst-order conditions, and applying the Envelope Theorem, the eﬀects of ﬁrst-period




























































The R&D game: Second-order conditions and the Jacobian
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1 | {z }
<0
.
We see that |J| > 0 provided that the ﬁrst term is either non-negative or suﬃciently small
in absolute value.
Proof of Proposition 1.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions of the R&D game, (12)-(13), applying Cramer’s Rule
and assuming |J| > 0,t h es i g n so f∂x∗
1/∂A1 and ∂x∗
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Notice that (10) together with ∂zi/∂xi > |∂zi/∂xj| ensure that Ω < 0. In both (A11)
and (A12), the ﬁrst term is unambiguously negative. The second term, which can poten-











is suﬃciently small. In (A12) the condition is weaker, since a suﬃcient condition for
∂x∗
2/∂A1 < 0 is that the second-order cross partial derivative of the success function is
non-negative. Q.E.D.
Proﬁts and utility in the informative advertising model
Using the demand and cost functions speciﬁed Section 5, second-period payoﬀs, as




























Using the Hotelling interpretation of the model given in Section 5, we can derive
aggregate consumer utility in each of the possible market structures. In the single-product












In the multi-product case, where either the incumbent or the entrant discovers the new
33product, aggregate consumer utility is given by
UM (A1,A 2)=UD (A1,A 2) (A20)
= A1 (1 − A2)
Z 1
0
(v − τy)dy + A2 (1 − A1)
Z 1
0









(v − τ (1 − y))dy
!




























k (1 − A1), yield aggregate utility as functions of ﬁrst-period advertising: UM (A1) and
UD (A1).
Proof of Proposition 3.
Part (i) and (ii): Since the denominators of (23) and (24) are equal, it is suﬃcient to
compare the numerators to decide the ranking of x∗
1 (A1) and x∗
2 (A1).
x∗
2 (A1) − x∗
1 (A1) ≥ 0
m
∆ := 8A1kc(4 − 3A1) − p2A1 (2 − A1)
3 ≥ 0. (A21)
By inspection of (A21), it is easily veriﬁed that limA1→0 ∆ =0 . This establishes part (i)
of the proposition.
To prove part (ii) of the proposition, we evaluate ∆ at the lower bound of c, i.e.,








> 0 for any A1 > 0.
Since ∆ is increasing in c, it must hold that x∗
2 (A1) >x ∗
1 (A1) for any c>cand A1 > 0.
























μ := 32ck(1 − A1) − p2 (2 − A1)(8− 3A1 (5 − 2A1)),
σ := p4 (1 − A1)(2− A1)(3A1 (3 + A1 (A1 − 3)) − 4),
ψ := 4ck − p2 (1 − A1)(3− 2A1),




We observe that ∂x∗
1 (A1)/∂A1 < 0 and ∂x∗
2 (A1)/∂A1 < 0 if the numerators are positive
in (A22) and (A23), respectively. Since the values of both numerators are increasing in c,















1 (2 − A1)(5− A1) > 0 for A1 ∈ [0,1].It follows that
∂x∗
1 (A1)/∂A1 < 0 and ∂x∗
1 (A1)/∂A1 < 0 for c>cand A1 ∈ [0,1]. Q.E.D.
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